Fragmenting Dominant Coalitions Causing Political Violence: Rwanda and Ethiopia as Limited Access Orders

Abstract

Mainstream political and economic approaches can fall short when applied to unrest in developing countries. Political theories focus on formal arrangements while neglecting informal networks. These networks often are more important in determining political realities in developing societies. They also lack precise criteria of state strength or weakness Fearon and Laitin, 2003. In economic frameworks, a lack of economic opportunity, by state interference, leads to conflict Collier and Hoeffler, 2002. Theories of corruption, rent seeking, and clientelism predict breakdown of social institutions as a direct result of politics hindering market forces Krueger 1974, Hutchcroft 1997, Manzetti and Wilson 2007, Kaufmann 1997. What is missing is a mechanism linking arrangements of political and economic power to the risk of violence. North’s theory of limited access orders (LAO) can provide this framework North et al 2013. This paper will apply North’s LAO theory to two Sub-Saharan African countries, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Both countries exhibit extreme horizontal economic and political inequality due to ethnic domination by a minority. Yet, only in Ethiopia has horizontal inequality led to political instability. This paper finds that the LAO framework useful for identifying institutional factors causing violence. After applying the framework to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the paper concludes that recent political instability in Ethiopia was caused by contradictions between formal political institutions and informal arrangements of power. This contradiction creates opportunities for internal rent seeking. Rwanda has escaped this through formalizing its method of rent seeking and distribution.

Discipline: Political Science

Faculty Mentor: Dr. Andrea Wagner